Cryptography is increasingly applied to the E-commerce world, especially to the untraceable payment system and the electronic voting system. Protocols for these systems strongly require the anonymous digital signature property, and thus a blind signature strategy is the answer to it. Chaum stated that every blind signature protocol should hold two fundamental properties, blindness and intractableness. All blind signature schemes proposed previously almost are based on the integer factorization problems, discrete logarithm problems, or the quadratic residues, which are shown by Lee et al. that none of the schemes is able to meet the two fundamental properties above. Therefore, an ECC-based blind signature scheme that possesses both the above properties is proposed in this paper.
INTRODUCTION
The concept of blind signature was first presented by Chaum [1] in 1982. A blind signature scheme for Chaum is initially kind of a protocol that a requester is allowed to obtain a valid signature sig(m) for his message m from a signer, who only signs the message and knows nothing about it. Afterwards, when the signer sees the message-signature pair (m, sig(m)), he just verifies whether the signature is genuine or not; however, he can not link the message-signature pair to the particular instance of the signing protocol which has led to this. Two problems, secure automated payment systems and electronic voting systems, were taken into considerations by Chaum. He pointed out that the multiplicity and growth of electronic services may have an impact on consumers' privacy and extent of criminal use. Thus, blind signature cryptosystem, a fundamentally different kind of cryptography, was strongly suggested. This new cryptosystem is totally designed to protect customer's privacy during the use of secure electronic payment systems by upholding the anonymity of participants. Basically speaking, a blind signature scheme is a protocol for a group of requesters and a signer. Each requester sends an encrypted message to the signer and obtains a valid signature from him. Note that the signer only signs the message and does not decrypt it. Later, the signer can verify the genuineness of the signature whenever he receives the message-signature pair; however, he cannot link the message-signature pair to the particular phase of the signing protocol that has led to this pair.
According to Chaum stated in [1] , a blind signature system is regarded as a two-key digital signature system along with a commutative style public key system that is because two functions are mainly required to establish a blind signature cryptosystem. They are:
(1) A signing function g known to the signer only and its corresponding inverse g′ known to the public, such that g′(g(m))=m and g′ gives no clues about g.
(2) A commuting function f and its inverse f′ known to the requester only, such that f′(g(f(m)))=g(m), in which f(m) and s give no clues about m.
Based on these functions, a blind signature protocol is consisted of four phases in series.
(1) A requester chooses a message m randomly, forms f(m), and supplies f(m) to the signer.
(2) The signer signs f(m) by applying g and returns the signed matter g(f(m)) to the requester.
(3) The requester strips g(f(m)) by applying f′ to yield f′(g(f(m)))=g(m).
(4) Anyone can check the stripped matter g(m) by applying the signer's public key g′ and checking whether g′(g(m))=m.
That is the characteristic of a blind signature scheme to protect the requester's identification from disclosure. Therefore, Chaum states two properties that a blind signature scheme should hold.
A.
Digital signature Under an agreement among all related parties, the digital signatures are used in private communication. All messages are capable of being encrypted and decrypted so as to ensure the integrity and non-repudiation of them. The concept of digital signatures originally comes from cryptography, and is defined to be a method that a sender's text messages are encrypted or decrypted via a hash function number in keeping the messages secured when transmitted. Especially, when a one-way hashing function is performed to a message, its related digital signature is generated called a message digest [22] . A one-way hash function is a mathematical algorithm that makes a message of any length as input, but of a fixed length as output. Because its one-way property, it is impossible for the third party to decrypt the encrypted messages. [23] Two phases of the digital signature process is described in the following.
1) Signing phase:
A sender firstly makes his message or data as the input of a one-way hashing function and then produces its corresponding message digest as the output. Secondly, the message digest will be encrypted by the private key of the sender. Thus, the digital signature of the message is done. Finally, the sender sends his message or data along with its related digital signature to a receiver.
2) Verification phase: Once the receiver has the message as well as the digital signature, he repeats the same process of the sender does, letting the message as an input into the one-way hashing function to get the first message digest as output. Then he decrypts the digital signature by the sender's public key so as to get the second message digest. Finally, verify whether these two message digests are identical or not.
When data are transmitted through the Internet, it is better that the data are protected by a cryptosystem beforehand to prevent them from tampering by an illegal third party. Basically, an encrypted document is sent, and it is impossible for an unlawful party to get the contents of the message, except he gets the sender's private key to decrypt the message. Under a mutual agreement between the senders and receivers, each sender holds a private key to encrypt his messages to send out, and a public key used by the receiver to decrypt his sent-out messages. When the two message digests are verified to be identical, the recipient can have the true text message. Thus, the security of data transmission can be made sure. How a digital signature works under a Public Key cryptosystem is shown in Figure 1 . A sender signs a message to the recipient by applying its own private key to the one-way hashing function D so as to get Si as the related digital signature of the message. When the recipient receives the message and the signature Si, he uses the sender's public key to verify the signature and the message as well through the hashing function E. If the two message digests are not identical, it is possible that the digital signature is being tampering. On the contrary, the message is true while they are identical.
B.
Blind signature
The signer signs the requester's message and knows nothing about it; moreover, no one knows about the correspondence of the message-signature pair except the requester. A short illustration of blind signature is described in the following and is shown in Figure. 2.
1) Blinding phase:
A sender firstly chooses a random number called a blind factor to mess his message such that the signer will be blind to the message.
2) Signing phase: When the signer gets the blinded message, he directly encrypts the blinded message by his private key and then sends the blind signature back to the sender.
3) Unblinding phase: The sender uses his blind factor determined in (a) to recover the signer's digital signature from the blinded signature.
4) Signature Verification phase: Anyone uses the signer's public key to verify whether the signature is genuine.
The first blind signature protocol proposed by Chaum is based on RSA system [2] . For each requester, he has to randomly choose a blind factor r first and supplies the encrypted message α to the signer, where α ≡ r e m (mod n). Note that n is the product of two large secret primes p and q, and e is the public key of the requester along with the corresponding secret key d such that ed ≡ 1 mod (p-1)(q-1). The integer r is called a blind factor because the signer will be blind to the message m after the computation of r e m (mod n). While getting α, the signer makes a signature β on it directly, where β ≡ α d (mod n) and then returns the signed message to the requester. The requester strips the signature β to yield an untraceable signature s, where s ≡ r -1 β (mod n), and announces the pair (m, s). Finally, anyone uses the signer's public key e to verify whether the signature is genuine by checking the formula s e ≡ m (mod n) holds. In 1994, Camenisch [6] gives a further definition of the blindness for a signature scheme. A signature scheme called blind by his definition is that the requester's view of a complete execution of the protocol, says V, and the message-signature pair (m, s(m)) generated in V are statistically independent. In other words, there exists a unique blinding factor for a valid message-signature pair (m, s(m)) such that two identical messages will be signed to yield two totally distinct signatures.
On reviewing all the previously proposed blind signature schemes [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] , Lee et al. [10] pointed out that none of the schemes that were based on factorization problem, discrete logarithm problem, or quadratic residues were able to satisfy both properties mentioned above.
Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem (ECC) is accepted to be a secure and efficient public-key cryptosystem. In [11] , Vanstone had concluded that ECC provided roughly 10 times greater efficiency than either integer factorization systems or discrete logarithm systems, in terms of computational overheads, key sizes and bandwidth. A formal and precise definition of ECC, along with clear examples, is described in [12] .
Here we would like to focus the security of ECC, relying upon the difficulty of solving the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. As were the cases with the integer factorization problem and the discrete logarithm problem modulo p, no efficient algorithms are known to solve the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. Vanstone [11] states," the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem is believed to be harder than both the integer factorization problem and the discrete logarithm problem modulo p." In such way, moderate security can be achieved by ECC over modulo a prime number p several times shorter than 150 decimal digitals.
All the schemes mentioned above either on Integer Factorization systems or on Discrete Logarithm systems, the key length for its security has increased over recent years. Vanstone stated in [11] that one could say it doesn't matter to use 1024-bit RSA to hold its security; however, if one could use 128-bit key to have an equivalent security level then why not do it? In fact, it is implemented that the key size in RSA demands 3072 bits for equivalent security but only a 256-bit ECC key [11] . ECC is provided with strong processing power, less storage space, and less power consumption. Thus, in the following we will present a novel blind signature scheme based upon ECC to achieve both of the properties of digital signature and blind signature efficiently.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in the next section, elliptic curve cryptosystem is described in details. Our blind signature scheme is presented in section 3. Security analysis is discussed in section 4. Finally, conclusions are made in section 5.
II. ELLIPTIC CURVE CRYPTOSYSTEM
There are a vast majority of the products and the standards using RSA for encryption, decryption and digital signatures. As we have seen, the key length for secure RSA has increased over the decades, and this has put a heavier processing load on its applications. This burden has ramifications, especially for electronic commerce sites that conduct large numbers of secure transactions [13] .
In 1985, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) was proposed by Neal Koblitz [14] and Victor Miller [15] . ECC is capable of improving the existed cryptogram systems in terms of having smaller system parameter, smaller public-key certificates, lower bandwidth usage, faster implementations, lower power requirements, and smaller hardware processor requirements [16] . Therefore, using ECC to build a cryptosystem is commendable by the reasons of high security and efficiency [17] . The mathematic settings of ECC are depicted below [17, 18] .
Firstly, elliptic curves are not ellipses. Actually, the elliptic curve cryptosystem makes use of elliptic curves in which the variables and coefficients are all restricted to elements of a finite field. Such a representation offers extra efficiency in the operation of ECC. Elliptic curves can be divided into two families: prime curves and binary curves. Prime curves (Z p ) are good to use in software application, because it does not require extended bit-fiddling operation, which binary curves require. Binary curves (GF(2 n )) are best for hardware application as it requires a few logic gates to build a powerful cryptosystems. Secondly, the variables and coefficients of the elliptic curves are limited to the elements of a finite field. Because of this limitation, it would increase the efficiency of ECC computing operation.
In the finite field Z p , defined modulo a prime p, an elliptic curve is represented as E p (a, b) : where (a, b) Z p and 4a 3 + 27b 2 mod p ≠ 0. The condition, 4a 3 + 27b 2 mod p ≠ 0, is necessary to ensure that y 2 = x 3 + ax + b (mod p) has no repeated factors, which means that a finite abelian group can be defined based on the set E p (a, b) [19] . Included in the definition of an elliptic curve is a point called the zero point denoted as O. The point O at infinity is the third point of intersection of any straight line with the curve. Thus there are points including (x, y), (x, -y), and O on a straight line.
For points on an elliptic curve, we define a certain addition, denoted "+". The addition rules are given below.
1) O + P = P and P + O = P, where O serves as the additive identity.
For any two points P = (x p , y p ) and Q = (x q , y q ) over E p (a, b), the elliptic curve addition operation, which is denoted as P + Q = R = (x r , y r ), satisfies the following rules. It is obvious that the addition operation in ECC is equal to the counterpart of modular multiplication in RSA, and the multiplication in ECC is the counterpart of modular exponentiation in RSA. To have a cryptographic system using elliptic curves over Zp, we have to get a "hard problem" as to factoring the product of two primes or taking the discrete logarithm. Consider the equation Q = kP, where Q, P∈ Ep(a, b) and k < p. It is relatively easy to have Q by given k and P, but it is relatively hard to determine k when given Q and P. This is called the discrete logarithm problem for elliptic curves.
Let the following equation as an example. Suppose we have the equation of the form denoted as E 17 (3, 5) (3, 5) . When P ≠ Q, we must derive λ before calculating P + Q, as follows: 1, 14) .
To calculate 2P, P = (5, 3), we must first derive λ as follows: 
III. OUR BLIND SIGNATURE SCHEME
Before describing our blind signature scheme, we would like to mention about the elliptic curve encryption and decryption processes. Several approaches to encryption and decryption about elliptic curves have been suggested in the literature. Basically speaking, a plaintext message m is represented to be an x-y point called Pm and it is the point Pm that will be encrypted as a ciphertext and subsequently decrypted. Stallings [13] states, "There are relatively straightforward techniques that can be used to represent a message as a point on an elliptic curve." Here is a method proposed by Koblitz [14] . Suppose E p (a, b) is an elliptic curve over Z p given by y 2 = x 3 + ax+ b. Let m be a message, depicted as a number 0 ≤ m < p/100. Let x i = 100m + i for 0 ≤ i < 100. In our scheme, an elliptic group E p (a, b) is formed as y 2 = x 3 +ax+b (mod p), where 4a 3 +27b 2 ≠ 0 mod p such that the elliptic group E p (a, b) is proper for cryptography. And then a base point G = (x, y) on E p (a, b) is determined whose order is a very large value n such that n× G = O. Two parties, namely a group of requesters, {R i | 1≤ i ≤ n, n ∈ N}, and a signer, are the participants in our blind signature scheme. For requester R i , he randomly selects a secret key n i ∈ Z p , and generates his corresponding public key P i ≡ n i ×G (mod p). Similarly, the signer selects a random element n s ∈ Z p as his secret key, while his corresponding public key is P s ≡ n s ×G
(mod p).
Suppose message m is to be signed. Requester R i firstly generates a blinding factor (n i × P i ) and sends the blinded message α to the signer, where α ≡ m× (n i × P i ) (mod p). The factor (n i × P i ) is called a blinding factor because the signer knows nothing to message m after the computation of m× (n i × P i ).
For each blinded message α asking for being signed, the signer randomly selects an element n v ∈ Z p as a second blinding factor and generates a pair of blind signatures (r, s) where r ≡ n v × α (mod p) and s ≡ (n v + n s )× α (mod p). Note that n s is the secret key of the signer.
Forward the message-signature pair (α, (r, s)) to requester R i . It is suggested that the signer should keep a record of (α, n v ) in the signer's database from collision. Though the possibility is little for two identical messages applied by the same blinding factor n v , a way to solve the situation is to keep a record so as to assign distinct blinding factors for the identical messages.
When requester R i receives the message-signature pair (α, (r, s)), he strips the signature (r, s) by applying his own secret key n i , along with the public key P s of the signer to yield a stripped signature s′, where s′≡ s − m× n i × P s (mod p). And then requester R i computes a corresponding number m′ from m such that m′ = n i (n i −1)⋅m.
Finally, requester R i publishes the triple (m′, s′, r) and anyone can use the signer's public key P s to verify the authentication of the stripped signature by checking whether the formula r ≡ s′− m′× P s (mod p) holds.
A short illustration of our blind signature protocol is described in the following and is shown in Figure. by checking whether the formula r ≡ s′− m′× P s (mod p) holds.
THEOREM 1:
The triple (m′, s′, r) is a valid signature of message m for the above protocol and the protocol is a blind signature scheme.
PROOF:
Prove that the triple (m′, s′, r) is a valid signature of message m for the above protocol.
The validity of the signature (m′, s′, r) can be easily be shown as follows, since s′ ≡ s − m× n i × P s (mod p), and m′ = n i (n i −1)m. We have
According to the blindness property defined by Camenisch, there will be two distinct message-signature pairs (m, (r 1 , s 1 )) and (m, (r 2 , s 2 ) ) yielded by giving two identical messages because the identical messages have a unique blinding factor n v each. In order to prove the blindness of the protocol, we show that given two identical message-signatures, the blinding factors applied on each are identical. Let n 1 and n 2 be the blinding factors respectively for two identical messages, and (r 1 , s 1 ) and (r 2 , s 2 ) be the corresponding signatures yielded from the above protocol. Suppose (r 1 , s 1 ) and (r 2 , s 2 ) are identical, we obtain
Both of the equations show that n 1 is equal to n 2 . Therefore, n 1 and n 2 being two distinct blinding factors implies that the corresponding signatures are distinct. Thus the blindness of our protocol holds.
As to the blindness defined by Chaum, the signer knows nothing about the relationship between the signed matter s and the stripped signed matter s′. It is obvious that the signer in our protocol is unable to trace s′ from s because s′ is generated by applying the secret key n i of requester R i . As we know, to derive the secret key of a requester is equivalent to solve the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. Thus, our protocol also holds the blindness property defined by Chaum. Therefore, our protocol satisfies the blindness property.
EXAMPLE 1:
Step 1: Let the elliptic curve equation be y 2 = x 3 + x + 1 (mod 5). The base point G = (4, 2) on the elliptic curve is determined. Make the elliptic curve equation and the base point public.
Step 2: A signer selects a random element 7 as his secret key and then generates his corresponding public key P s , where P s ≡ 7×(4, 2) (mod 5).
Step 3: A requester selects a random element 11 as his secret key and then generates his corresponding public key P i , where P i ≡ 11×(4, 2) (mod 5).
Step 4: The requester sets his blinding factor as (11 × P i ) so as to transform his message m into a blinded message α, where α ≡ m× (11× P i ) (mod 5). Then he sends the blinded message α to the signer.
Step A. Verification phase Anyone can use the signer's public key P s to verify the authentication of the signature (m′, s′, r) by checking whether the formula r ≡ s′− m′× P s (mod 5) holds.
PROOF:
The validity of the signature (m′, s′, r) can be easily be shown as follows, since s′ ≡ s − m× 11 × P s (mod 5), and m′ = 11 (11−1) ⋅m. We have s′− m′× P s = s − m× 11 × P s − m′× P s = s − m×11 × P s − 11 (11 −1)⋅m× P s = s − m× 11 × P s − 11 ×11 ×m× P s + 11 ×m× P s = s − 11 ×11×m× P s = (21 + 7)× α− 11 ×11 ×m× P s = (21 + 7)× m× (11 × P i )− 11 ×11 ×m× P s = 21× m× 11 × P i + 7× m× 11 × P i − 11 ×11 ×m× P s = 21× m× 11 × P i + 7× m× 11 × 11×(4, 2) − 11 ×11 × m × 7×(4, 2)= 21× m× 11 × P i = 21 × α ≡ r (mod 5)
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we would like to examine that our scheme satisfies the properties that a blind signature should hold.
A.
Property of digital signature
1) The authentication of the stripped signature s′ can be verified by anyone using the signer's public key P s as shown in Theorem 1.
2)
No one else can copy the signed matter (r, s) as the signer's so as to pass the verification phase because copying a signed matter is equivalent to solve the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. Vanstone [11] has pointed out," the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem is believed to be harder than both the integer factorization problem and the discrete logarithm problem modulo p."
B.
Property of blind signature 1) As the blinding factor r to Chaum's blind signature scheme, so is the elliptic curve point (n i × P i ) to our scheme. The blinded message α of our scheme is generated as α = m × (n i × P i ) mod p. The signer is unable to derive the message m without the value n i . By the way, our scheme is satisfied the blindness property since the signer signs the blinded message and knows nothing about the true message.
2) The signer in our scheme also has no ideas on the correspondence between the signed matter s and the stripped signed matter s′ since s and s′ are two distinct points on the elliptic group E p (a, b). The signer also can not trace s′ from s since s′ is yielded by applying the secret key n i of requester R i . 3) According to Camenisch's definition of the blindness for a signature scheme, a unique blinding factor is required for a valid message-signature pair (m, s(m)). The number n v in our scheme serves the job. Note that for each blinded message asking for being signed, the signer randomly selects n v as the blinding factor and for two identical messages, the signer will apply two distinct factors to yield totally distinct signatures. Next we would like to discuss the computational complexity of our scheme. The efficiency of ECC totally depends on the fast calculation of Q = k × P by giving a number k and a point P on the curve. The process of adding elliptic curve points requires a few modular addition calculations only. Vanstone in [6] summarized that ECC provided much greater efficiency with order of magnitude roughly 10 times than either integer factorization systems or discrete logarithm systems. Obviously, the kernel operation makes our scheme advantageous for the sake of ECC giving the benefits of higher speed, lower power consumption and code size reduction. Thus the proposed scheme is suitable for electronic commerce sites that conduct large numbers of secure transactions such as for electronic voting systems and cash payment systems.
Finally, we discuss the storage required in our scheme. Only two keys namely the secret key and public key have to be stored for each participant in our scheme. The signer requires more extra storage for recording pairs of (α, n v ). Fortunately, Stallings [13] estimated that a key length of 4096 bits for RSA gives the same level of security as 313 bits in an elliptic curve system. Therefore, our scheme is sure to be secure by setting up the size of the prime p in E p (a,b) to be 300 bits. As a result, the storage required in the proposed scheme is fixed and small in comparison to those schemes mentioned above based upon either integer factorization systems or discrete logarithm systems, whose prime is required with 100 digits for secure.
V. CONCLUSIONS
So far, only three classes of public key cryptosystem are considered secure and efficient. They are Integer Factorization Systems, Discrete Logarithm Systems, and Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem. The key length to ensure the security of RSA has increased over the decades and has put a heavier processing load on its applications. It is roughly estimated that a key size of 4096 bits for RSA gives the same level of security as 313 bits in ECC. Vanstone also had pointed out that ECC provided the greatest efficiency among the three, with order of magnitude roughly 10 times greater than the others.
Blind signature is a very important cryptographic primitive nowadays used in protocols such as electronic voting systems and cash payment systems to guarantee the anonymity of the participants. All blind signature schemes proposed previously were based on either integer factorization problems, the discrete logarithm problems or quadratic residues. However, Lee et al. had shown that none of the schemes can satisfy with both of the properties, i.e. digital signature and blindness.
Our scheme shows efficiency owing to lower storage requirements and computational overhead, which is due to the use of ECC. Compared to other blind signature schemes, which are based on either of the two other public-key cryptosystems, our scheme offers equal security but much smaller key sizes. Therefore, there are less computational overheads in our scheme. Besides, our scheme also satisfies the requirements of a blind signature scheme. Therefore, our proposed scheme can be efficiently applied to electronic cash payment systems or anonymous voting systems.
